Executive control refers to the regulation of cognition and behavior by mental 3 processes and is a hallmark of higher cognition. Most approaches to understanding its 4 mechanisms begin with the assumption that our brains have anatomically segregated and 5 functionally specialized control modules. The modular approach is intuitive: control is 6 conceptually distinct from basic mental processing, so an organization that reifies that 7 distinction makes sense. An alternative approach sees executive control as self-8 organizing principles of a distributed organization. In distributed systems, control and 9 controlled processes are co-localized within large numbers of dispersed computational 1 0 agents. Control then is often an emergent consequence of simple rules governing the 1 1 interaction between agents. Because these systems are unfamiliar and unintuitive, here 1 2 we review several well-understood examples of distributed control systems, group living 1 3
involves elements like precise timing, inhibition of prepotent responses, and control of 3 4 2 vigor. Another important but less well-appreciated requirement is avoiding intermediate
responses, so that the system can either fully stop or fully go, without drifting between 3 4 4 the two extremes. In other words, being indeterminate can be costly and even lethal in 3 4 5 urgent situations so that the distributed system has to be able to deal with this problem. Our example of stop/go control in a distributed control system comes from the 3 4 7 luminous bacterium Vibrio fischeri (Waters & Bassler, 2005; Nealson & Hastings, 1979;  3 4 8 Miller & Bassler, 2001) . This single-celled organism lives in the light organ of the 3 4 9
Hawaiian bobtail squid (Euprymna scolopes) and emits light when the squid hunts at 3 5 0 night. The light serves to camouflage the squid that otherwise would be visible in the 3 5 1 form of a moonlit silhouette to prey below it (Visick et al., 2000) . During the day the 3 5 2 squid hides from potential predators in the dirt and turns its eyes off by extruding most of 3 5 3 the bacteria into the surrounding ocean. As the day progresses the remaining bacteria reproduce rapidly, and, by nightfall, have replenished their stock so that there are enough 3 5 5 bacteria to serve as an effective camouflage. The control problem comes from the fact that the bacteria must not luminesce 3 5 7 during the day as they are reproducing. Instead they need to switch to lighting at night all 3 5 8 at once. In other words, bioluminescence needs to be both inducible and repressible 3 5 9 (Nealson & Hastings, 1979) . Because of their reproduction pattern, they can do this by 3 6 0 waiting until there is a quorum of other V. fischeri bacteria in the squid light organ. But which creates a complex that induces transcription of genes needed for luminescence 3 6 5 (Kaplan & Greenberg, 1985; Stevens & Dolan, 1994) . The transcription process is only 3 6 6 triggered when the local density of AHL reaches a predetermined threshold, which serves 3 6 7 as a go signal for the bacteria ( Figure 5 ). shelter: how vibrio fischeri successfully navigates an animals multiple environments" 3 7 6 (Norsworthy & Visick, 2013) . There are several features used by the system to stop, i.e. to prevent premature 3 7 9 luminescence. These features work by implementing negative feedback (Waters & 3 8 0 Bassler, 2005). One feature is regulation of the stability of the constituent proteins: they 3 8 1 are more stable when AHL is more concentrated (Zhu & Winans, 1999) . Another is 3 8 2 active pumping of AHL out of the cell: this process reduces cytoplasmic levels of AHL 3 8 3 and thus dampens sensitivity until AHL concentration is high enough to overwhelm the 3 8 4 pumping mechanism (Pearson et al., 1999) . neuroscientist. First, the system implements a clock-like function by taking advantage of 3 8 7 the consistency in reproduction rates of its own members. No member or subgroup serves 3 8 8 as a clock or other timer function. In other words, the timing function is an emergent 3 8 9 property of the system. Second, there is no centralized site that tells the bacteria when to 3 9 0 glow; each individual agent makes up its own tiny mind, but, because they are in the 3 9 1 same environment, their activity is effectively coordinated through the localized cross-3 9 2 signaling of individual cells. Third, the system implements a specific and precise 3 9 3 threshold-crossing process (a simple rule based on concentration levels of AHL), even 3 9 4 though no abstract decision variable is calculated or represented. Finally, there is no need 3 9 5 for any kind of modular self-control or inhibition. The lack of glowing (repressability) is 3 9 6 1 4 simply a consequence of the fact that there are insufficient concentrations of chemicals to 3 9 7 drive the glowing; inhibition in this system is an emergent process (cf. Hampshire & 3 9 8 Sharp, 2015). accurate as a deliberate one, but it will have the virtue of speed (Houston, Kacelnik, & of cognitive psychology (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Wickelgren, 1977; Roitman & 4 0 7 Shadlen, 2002; Chittka et al., 2003; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Bogacz et al., 2010) 4 0 8 and animal psychology (Chittka, Skorupski, & Raine, 2009) . Like humans and animals, 4 0 9 many distributed decision-making systems make speed-accuracy tradeoffs, including nest and evaluate potential locations within a few square meters  4 1 4 Franks et al., 2003) . These ants prefer to live in small colonies in thin cracks in rocks and 4 1 5
are therefore easy to study in laboratory conditions . An ant that finds 4 1 6 a potential nest site will recruit other ants to evaluate it by leading a tandem run back to This whole search and quorum-sense process is slow but accurate. But if the 4 2 6 situation calls for a fast decision (such as during windy weather or threat of predation), 4 2 7 the ant colony can make a speed-accuracy tradeoff (Franks et al., 2003) . Specifically, 4 2 8 each ant can reduce the threshold it uses to decide whether to switch from tandem run 4 2 9 recruitment mode to carrying mode. The tandem run, being slower, allows other ants 4 3 0 more time to discover other sites; the carry terminates the process more quickly. The ant 4 3 1 itself doesn't know explicitly about the speed-accuracy tradeoff; it just has an internal 4 3 2 sense of weather and adjusts its quorum-sensing procedure -and the group's speed-4 3 3 accuracy tradeoff is an emergent consequence (Franks et al., 2003) .
The neuroscience of the speed-accuracy tradeoff is not fully understood, but the 4 3 5 parallels are easy to discern. It is believed that there is a threshold integration process for 4 3 6 perceptual decisions (Bogacz et al., 2010) . Recent work suggests it may involve changes measure of hive activity, say, the number of active scouts or number of active dances We turn now to the neuroscience of control. As noted above, there is a broad 5 0 7 consensus that executive control is modular, not distributed (Botvinick & Cohen, 2014) .
0 8
We believe that one reason for relative unpopularity of distributed control systems by 5 0 9
scholars is that they are unfamiliar and unintuitive. Indeed, distributed control is
notoriously difficult for us to intuit. Terms like the "ghost in the machine," "the invisible 5 1 1 hand of the marketplace," "asking the hive mind" are reminders that our own minds 5 1 2 naturally impute discrete and coherent agency even when dealing with mindless and 5 1 3 ghostless distributed systems. Still, many distributed control systems are intuitive and can 5 1 4 become more so with familiarity. Neuroscience methods make modularity easier to find 5 1 7
Another factor disfavoring distributed control models is that the major methods for 5 1 8 studying executive control, lesion, neuroimaging, and single unit recording, all arguably 5 1 9
have some bias towards finding evidence of modularity.
Neuroimaging, like lesion studies, measures aggregate function of a given brain 5 2 1 area or voxel, and thus cannot determine properties of the individual agents of the 5 2 2 nervous system, neurons. This is true for multi-voxel pattern analysis as well as for ROI- about the specific types of local, horizontal, and narrow-bandwidth signals that are 5 2 6 crucial for distributed systems. But it is very good at detecting even weak signals at a 5 2 7 broad range, meaning it can readily measure emergent properties of neural populations.
2 8
The limitations of the lesion method are illustrated in a study by Plaut (1995) . In this 5 2 9 work, he shows how even the double dissociation, the gold standard of lesion studies, is Single unit physiology studies are just as limited, although in the opposite way. the cost of inability to measure function at the level of the interregional network. lesion techniques (Lashley, 1929) . This may have been because lesions to distributed 5 4 0 systems do not selectively impair discrete functions, but instead have complex and 5 4 1 unpredictable effects (Farah, 2004) . Lashley found that degradation of behavioral 5 4 2 performance depended on the amount of the brain regions removed independent of the 5 4 3 precise location: they characteristically led to graceful degradation, which he interpreted 5 4 4 as the product of mass action (Lashley, 1929) . But when there is even a moderate amount 5 4 5 of specialization in the system, they can lead to moderate but measurable effects. The 5 4 6 interpretation of these effects, however, will be influenced by the experimenter's 5 4 7 theoretical framework. To look at these general issues in detail, we will take the dorsal anterior cingulate dopamine signals, and projects to motor, premotor, and executive regions. These factors Hillman & Bilkey, 2010).
7 3
These findings generally support a modular view of cognition, one in which dACC 5 7 4 takes on the specialist role of monitor and controller. However, a broader review suggests 5 7 5 that dACC is neither uniquely involved in monitoring and control, not is its function 5 7 6 primarily these two roles. Indeed, the very long list of functions above should raise 5 7 7 suspicion for a devotee of the modular viewpoint. Yes, these variables can all be placed in the dACC? Unlikely. Most of these functions are shared with many other brain regions 5 8 1 (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010) . For example, recent work points to the important of the orbital 5 8 2 surface in classically anterior cingulate functions like conflict monitoring and resolution 5 8 3 (Mansouri, 2014) , and regulating the explore-exploit tradeoff .
8 4
Studies that compare dACC activity with other brain regions often find that cingulate cortex, the thalamus, and the striatum (e.g. Hayden, Smith, & Platt, 2010) .
9 1
More broadly, summaries of dACC function tend to emphasize its potentially 5 9 2 specialized role as a hub, linking visceral, cognitive, and motor systems (Bush, Luu, 5 9 3 &Posner, 2000; Morecraft & VanHoesen, 1997; Rushworth et al., 2011; Paus, 2001; 5 9 4 Heilbronner and . But is it really all that specialized? There is anatomical 5 9 5 and functional evidence for it's hub-nature, but it's also true of other brain regions, including, for example, PCC Heilbronner & Platt, 5 9 7 2013) and insula. Indeed, rich interconnectivity is a feature of many brain systems (Wang 5 9 8 & Kennedy, 2016; Heilbronner & Haber, 2014; .
9 9
Nor are the response properties observed in the dACC uniquely control-related. Many of them seem to fit naturally into the category of stimulus-response processing, 6 0 1 rather than as a regulator of that processing. That is, if we think of the brain as a system 6 0 2 1 9 that converts sensory inputs to motor outputs, we should expect in a modular brain to find 6 0 3 no sensory and motor signals in dACC, and instead find pure control-selective signals 6 0 4 (Cisek, 2012) . Instead, dACC is prominently responsive to both sensory stimuli and to 6 0 5 actions. One convenient parameter to look at is spatial representation; this is a prominent 6 0 6 property of the physical world but should, in theory, not be part of the recondite world of 6 0 7 control. And yet dACC encodes the locations of stimuli under consideration and the 6 0 8 specific details of actions Isomura et al., 2003; Luk & Wallis, 6 0 9 2009; Stoll et al., 2016? ; Strait et al., 2016; Shima & Tanji, 1998) .
Together these pieces of evidence argue that the differences between the dACC and 6 1 1 adjacent structures are not as strong as is conventionally believed. They suggest instead a 6 1 2 broad continuity of function between dACC and its neighbors and afferents. The broad 6 1 3 functions, especially in the control domain, that it serves, are more distributed than Maybe executive control could be distributed in the brain?
A priori, it is not unreasonable to think so. A basic description of the brain sounds 6 2 4 like an ideal candidate for a distributed control system. Neurons are agents that can only 6 2 5 communicate with a very small number of neighbors relative to the whole population. Like bacteria, they use a variety of diffusible chemicals to communicate. Each neuron 6 2 7 can monitor an extremely limited portion of the world and can broadcast its signals to a 6 2 8 very narrow part of the world as well. Each neuron has limited but powerful and non- Moreover, each cell is autonomous, but they work together, non-competitively, in 6 3 1 the service of a much larger goal (overcoming competition is a major barrier for many 6 3 2 distributed systems, Sumpter, 2006) . Individual neurons possess the ability to regulate the 6 3 3 activity of other neurons (or output structures) through changes in firing rate. This 6 3 4 activity can serve as both a processing and a regulatory role. The properties of the whole 6 3 5 system (the brain) are rich and flexible, much more so than any of its constituents 6 3 6 (Hofstadter, 1985, Ch. 26). The brain makes use of both positive and negative feedback, Strong circumstantial evidence for the distributed view comes from lesion studies 6 3 9 (Farah, 2004; Wilson et al., 2010) . Damage has surprisingly weak and graded effects; 1987). Of the major "clean" effects associated with lesions (prosopagnosia, hemianopia, Schneider, 2007; Erika-Florence, Leech, & Hampshire, 2014) . Ultimately, they suggest 7 0 1 that stopping may not be a valid psychological construct, but rather a term used to 7 0 2 describe intuitively similar behaviors. that the DLPFC serves as the site of working memory storage (Kubota & Niki, 1971 ; 7 0 6 Funahashi, Bruce, & Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Alexander & Fuster, 1971 ; reviewed in 7 0 7 Riley & Constantinidis, 2016) . The key evidence for this idea was the fact that single 7 0 8 neurons in that region showed systematic changes associated with the contents of 7 0 9 working memory. This is a modular view: it proposes that specific rostral regions serve The alternative view proposes that neurons in frontal regions regulate storage 7 1 5 (Lebedev et al., 2004; Postle, 2005) , but that caudal regions responsible for perception 7 1 6 are reactivated during working memory, and that their reactivation serves to store the 7 1 7 information on-line (Harrison & Tong, 2009 ). This view thus sees perceptual neurons as 2005; Miller & Wang, 2006; David et al., 2008; Jun & Romo, 2010; Mirabella et al., 7 2 3 2007; Hayden & Gallant, 2013; Ogawa & Komatsu, 2004) . Working memory is interesting to use because of its centrality in the history of 7 2 5 modular theories (i.e. most theories) of executive control (Baddeley Hitch, 1974;  7 2 6 Baddeley, 1996) . Especially, the concept of the central executive, which supports the 7 2 7 short-term memory in demanding tasks, has been thought to play a diverse control 7 2 8 functions. However, subsequent studies discredited the general function of the central organization gets around the specter of infinite regress (Cooper, 2010) . For example, if
we have a special centralized organization system, we need another system to build and 7 5 1 maintain it, and to monitor its functioning, and so on, ad infinitum. Self-organizing 7 5 2 systems are easier developmentally -there is no need to pre-specify their organization 7 5 3 genetically or any other way. They are also more robust to damage and can more readily are less complex (Sumpter, 2006) . From a theoretical perspective, distributed system 7 5 8 makes sense. Many brain functions are distributed, including perception and object 7 5 9 recognition, storage of episodic memories, motor planning and execution, and, arguably, 7 6 0 economic decision-making (Strait, Sleezer, & Hayden, 2015; Cisek, 2012; Cisek & Distributed control systems may be more difficult to study than modular ones 7 6 5 with conventional methods. In many studies (including, we hasten to admit, many of our 7 6 6 own), we pick out some psychological process of interest. We then ask whether brain 7 6 7 activity in some neuron or voxel within a given brain region correlates with a measure of 7 6 8 that variable. If we get a positive result, the simplest step is to infer that that variable is 7 6 9 reified in the brain. The distributed perspective cautions against this strategy; such 7 7 0 correlations may be real, but may only correlate with emergent properties of the system. And if the underlying processes are dissimilar, we will draw false conclusions. In other 7 7 2 words, we are always in danger of reifying higher level processes at the lower level. Hillman, K.L., Bilkey, D.K. (2010) . Neurons in the rat anterior cingulate cortex dynamically encode cost-benefit in a spatial decision-making task. Journal of Neuroscience. 30:7705-7713.
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